The death of Osama bin Laden at the hands of United States Special Forces in Pakistan this month has turned a lens on the sustainability of his al-Qaeda radical offshoots, with analysts weighing the strength of the connections between the group he led and the scores of small jihadi cells that operate across the world.
Some analysts here predict Bin Laden's death will have little impact on terror groups in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country. Islamic fundamentalists have struggled to gain a dominant foothold here amid the syncretic form of Islam practiced by the majority of adherents.
Others suggest it could lead to acts of retribution by hardlinegroups galvanized by his martyrdom. The mixed threat perceptions are not unusual: in a country often hailed by the West for its religious tolerance and recent democratic development, there are still radical fringes that speak louder than their underlying numbers, witnessed in a series of destructive terrorist attacks.
On May 4, the Islamic Defenders Front, or FPI, a group of thuggish ideologues renowned for attacking bars and nightclubs in defense of Islamic piety, held what they called a mass prayer for Bin Laden. In reality, the gathering revealed the FPI's proclivity for responses that are heavy on rhetoric but weak on action.
While calling Bin Laden a hero and martyr, the radical group also said it doubted his death. The FPI has recently been accused of inciting sectarian violence, but has not been linked to acts of terrorism. Other small rallies held here to "avenge" Bin Laden's death carried similarly weak threats of action.
What worries analysts is that Bin Laden's death could give a boost to his brand, which in Indonesia served more as a source of inspiration than operational direction. "If he becomes a myth it would give ideological support to a lot of these new decentralized groups that might not otherwise have a central rallying point," said Evan Laksmana, a security researcher at the Jakarta-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
He argues that the likelihood of that happening is small, noting past swings in support for the al-Qaeda leader and his advocacy of violent jihad. But as past efforts to decapitate radical networks in Indonesia show, charismatic leadership is no longer the most important factor holding them together.
Mission accomplished?
Since 2001, al-Qaeda has decentralized, splitting into regional movements in the Arabian Peninsula and Southeast Asia with diffuse leadership. While Bin Laden did not directly advise the many groups that used the al-Qaeda brand, his death is significant because his icon served to unite members of both old and fledgling extremist groups.
United States authorities claimed after Bin Laden's assassination that he commanded from remote al-Qaeda terror cells in Somalia and Yemen. They have said material recovered from his compound in Pakistan showed that he was rehearsing statements, a sign that he was still active in seclusion.
There is no evidence Bin Laden was directly responsible for any of the attacks, planned or thwarted, in Indonesia. Since the 9/11 attacks on the US, the al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) orchestrated some of Southeast Asia's most violent acts of terrorism, including the 2002 Bali bombing that killed over 200 people, mostly foreign tourists.
In August 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, then al-Qaeda's number two, appeared on a recorded video saying that JI and al-Qaeda had joined forces and had formed "one line, facing its enemies". Yet al-Qaeda's brand of large-scale terror, which often caused the deaths of innocent Muslims here, was arguably already on the wane in Indonesia before Bin Laden's death.
Working with the United States and Australia to establish a counter-terrorism intelligence unit known as Detachment 88, Indonesian police have scored several big hits against JI leaders, including the 2007 capture of Abu Dujana, the JI's reputed head of military operations, and the 2009 assassination of JI recruiter and bomb-maker Noordin Top.
Over the past decade, counter-terrorism police have arrested more than 600 suspected terrorists and brought around 500 of them to trial, according to security officials. Last month, a Jakarta court sentenced high-level suspected terrorist Abdullah Sonata to 10 years in prison for providing arms to a militant training camp in Aceh.
Abu Bakar Bashir, a firebrand cleric believed to be JI's spiritual head, is also on trial for funding the camp. The verdict in his case, which could apply the death penalty, is scheduled for mid-June. Some analysts here say a guilty verdict against him would cement the significant losses JI has already suffered.
Unexplained links
Still, there are unanswered questions about the extent of the JI's links to al-Qaeda. Top terror suspect Umar Patek, a JI member suspected of involvement in the 2002 Bali bombing, was arrested in Abbottabad, the same town in Pakistan where Bin Laden was killed.
Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro told reporters last week that Patek planned to meet Bin Laden, but a US counter-terrorism official told the Associated Press it was "pure coincidence" that both men were found hiding there.
Security analysts say Patek could provide significant information about the connections between Southeast Asian terrorist groups like JI and their extremist counterparts in Pakistan. Like many JI suspects, Patek was on the run. But the frequency of his contact and nature of his discussions with Bin Laden remain ambiguous.
What is clear, however, is that terror groups in Indonesia have downsized under pressure. "The violence here is small-group initiated, more aimed at targeted killings than big bombings and more aimed at local targets than foreigners," said Sidney Jones, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG). ICG released a report last month on how violent extremism increasingly occurs independent of large jihadi organizations like JI.
The shift has been driven by successful law-enforcement activities and changing ideological trends in the Middle East, Jones said. "There can be international changes that have an impact on the definition of enemy and the choice of targets, even in a place as peripheral as Indonesia," Jones said after Patek's arrest. She suggested "Bin Laden's death could change the direction back toward Western targets, at least momentarily".
Images of American youths cheering Bin Laden's demise on television and headlines like the New York Daily's May 2 edition, which read "Rot in Hell", may only inflame radical sentiments. But for now the potential for revenge attacks seems limited by the diminished capacity and perceived disconnect of Indonesia's extremist groups.
Many top JI leaders fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, but their younger counterparts now receive more encouragement than training from the old guard. With its leaders detained or decapitated, JI has shifted toward more recruitment activities, including sermons and spreading information on the Internet. As such, the response to Bin Laden's death is expected to be met with more rhetoric than violence.
Sara Schonhardt is a freelance writer based in Jakarta, Indonesia. She has lived and worked in Southeast Asia for six years and has a master's degree in international affairs from Columbia University.
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