- The killing of Osama bin Laden has closed a crucial chapter in the decades-long fight against global terrorism, but it is far from closing the book. As many analysts have pointed out, the global "war on terror" has entered the post-Bin Laden era, one that filled with equally, if not more, grim challenges.
Among the key questions raised so far include: How will al-Qaeda re-group and who will likely be the successor to Bin Laden? What does the May 1 raid on the Abbottabad compound say about Pakistan's role and the future of its ties with the United States? Will the success of the operation renew the debate on the anti-terrorism methods, including the overall US AfPak strategy?
Another important question that has yet to be asked is how the death of the al-Qaeda founder affects US-China cooperation on anti-terrorism. The answer to this question has important implications, not only for Sino-US relations but also for the geopolitics of South and Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf.
United States-China anti-terrorism cooperation has been relatively solid since September 11, 2001. The Chinese government immediately offered its condolence and support to the George W Bush administration in the wake of the terrorist attacks on America and the two countries have since established various channels of communication and mechanisms to coordinate their counter-terrorism efforts.
Bilateral cooperation has included intelligence-sharing, the posting of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents in China, and US exports of sensitive technologies and equipment to assist China in preventing potential terrorist sabotages prior to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing.
In September 2002, the Bush administration formally designated the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which seeks independence of Xinjiang from China, as a terrorist organization, which was subsequently classified as such through the United Nations Security Council resolutions sponsored by the United States and China.
Both China and the United States have benefited from this sustained cooperation. For Beijing, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent shift of US strategic priorities dissipated, if not completely dispelled, storms in Sino-US relations.
During the 2000 US presidential campaigns and immediately after the Bush administration took office, China was clearly identified as a strategic competitor, against which Washington had been aligning and strengthening its alliances in East Asia.
And then there was the crisis touched off by the mid-air collision of a US EP-3 spy aircraft and the subsequent detaining of US crew members by the Chinese. The Bush administration approved the largest arms sales to Taiwan in over a decade and Bush himself vowed to defend Taiwan "whatever it takes". The two powers were on a collision course.
The terrorist attacks and the need to enlist major power cooperation on the "war on terror" provided the opportunity for Beijing and Washington to set aside their differences and focus the new realities in international geopolitics. China had as much reasons to be concerned with terrorism, with home-grown ethnic separatist groups in Xinjiang increasingly resorting to terrorist tactics. At the same time, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia became the havens for these elements that could launch terrorist attacks against Chinese interests at home and abroad.
Beijing was especially concerned over the stability of Pakistan in the post-9/11 world as Washington moved closer to New Delhi. The Chinese government counseled - and Washington apparently listened - that the effectiveness of the "war on terror" must include the collaboration and support of Islamabad. An unstable Pakistan would seriously undermine global efforts in combating terrorism.
China also took the opportunity and played an active role in the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that includes Russia and three Central Asian republics in their joint fight against the "three evils" - international terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism.
As much as they have cooperated in anti-terrorism efforts, Beijing and Washington have also displayed serious differences over the designation of terrorist groups, approaches to combating terrorism, and priorities in resource commitments in the war on terrorism.
While Beijing has designated a number of groups as terrorist organizations, including the ETIM, Washington has a narrower definition and considers many of these as harboring no more than greater ethnic autonomy, and has criticized China over their mistreatment.
United States approaches to conducting the "war on terror" put more emphasis on the military aspects of physically eliminating terrorist groups or at the minimum dealing serious blows to their operations, to the extent that some of these harsher methods seriously alienated important stakeholders (most notably some of the Islamic countries) in the global campaign against terrorism.
The Chinese government, on the other hand, stresses the importance of dealing with both the causes and symptoms of terrorism and therefore favors more cautious policies.
Washington has urged Beijing to be more involved in the AfPak strategy, but with only limited success. While the Chinese government has demonstrated its willingness to provide financial assistance in re-building Afghanistan, it has confined its activities to some of reconstructing efforts and investments in energy and infrastructure projects.
Indeed, Western analysts have pointed out that Beijing has been able to get the windfall of profitable contracts from Kabul without the loss of "blood and treasure" inflicted on US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces.
Instead, Beijing has invested in the establishment and strengthening of the SCO in its counter-terrorism efforts and has used the platform both to demonstrate its leadership in multilateral institutions and expand its influence into a region of increasing importance to China's security interests, include as a source of energy supplies. Indeed, this later development has raised questions in Washington whether Beijing's efforts are aimed at excluding US influence from the Eurasian landmass.
Both Washington and Beijing understand that the demise of Bin Laden by no means spells the end of al-Qaeda and other forms of terrorism. If anything, the "war on terror" will be a drawn-out one that requires continued cooperation between the two countries and the international community as a whole.
For the United States, there is the need to brace for revenge and retaliation from Bin Laden's followers. For China, its ever expanding presence in global affairs exposes its companies and citizens to potential terrorist actions as a general expression of deprivation and grievances.
China and the United States have every reason for continuing and even strengthening cooperation but they have to manage two potential fallouts in the aftermath of the Bin Laden killing.
One is the impact of a deteriorating relationship and deep distrust between Washington and Islamabad on Sino-Pakistan ties. Clearly, the resentment stoked in Pakistan opens up the opportunity for Beijing to further cement the all-weather relationship between two of Asia's long-standing friends. Will America's loss be a gain for China and will Beijing take the advantage of the situation and regain its influence in Pakistan?
The other fallout is whether the Bin Laden raid will usher in the beginning of a drawdown and eventual withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan to refocus on China. Many Western strategic analysts have lamented the fact that the Afghan and Iraqi quagmires have distracted Washington materially and strategically, with the result that China has made critical strategic gains elsewhere.
However, Beijing and Washington would be short-sighted if they formulated their policies based on these zero-sum analyses of developments on the ground. The two countries have much to gain to continue the fruitful cooperation of the past decade and make sound decisions during this critical juncture of the "war on terror".
Dr Jingdong Yuan is an associate professor at the Center for International Security Studies, University of Sydney.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
No comments:
Post a Comment